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Abstract. The notion of identity-based proxy signature with message recovery feature has been proposed to shorten identity-based proxy signatures and improve their communication overhead since signed
messages are not transmitted with these kinds of signatures. There are a few schemes for this notion:
Singh and Verma’s scheme and Yoon et al.’s scheme. Unfortunately, Tian et al. by presenting two
forgery attacks show that Singh and Verma’s scheme is not secure, and also Yoon et al.’s scheme does
not support provable security. The contributions of this paper are twofold. First, we review Yoon et al.’s
scheme and discuss why it does not have message recovery property, and consequently it is not short.
Second, we propose a short identity-based proxy signature scheme with the help of message recovery
property, and show that it is secure under CDH assumption in the random oracle model. Furthermore,
our scheme is more efficient than (as efficient as) previous identity-based proxy signatures.
Keywords: identity-based signature, identity-based signature with message recovery, identity-based
proxy signature, CDH assumption, random oracle model.
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Introduction

The possibility to implement digital signatures is one of the most important achievements of modern cryptography. Digital signatures are widely deployed around the world and have the backing of significant international legislation to support their use in electronic business. Businesses need to be flexible about the
way that they employ signatures and so there is a need for digital signature algorithms to support typical
business practices. One such flexible type of signature is the proxy signature which permits the common
business practice of delegating signing authority in a flexible manner. We are interested in exploring proxy
signatures in the identity-based setting.
Identity-based cryptography. Public-key cryptography has many different applications, but in its
basic format requires extensive public-key infrastructure for practical use [1]. In order to provide more flexible
management of public keys the notion of identity-based cryptography was introduced by Shamir [2]. The main
feature of identity-based cryptosystems is to remove the requirement of certification of the public keys. The
public key of each entity is obtained from its public identity, such as the IP address or email address, which
uniquely identifies it. Since Shamir introduced this notion [2], different identity-based signature schemes [3–5]
are proposed. Identity-based signatures with message recovery feature are proposed to minimize the size of
signed messages and consequently size of these kinds of signatures. Therefore, these primitives are helpful
when an organization intends to reduce the required bandwidth in transmission, or when it is necessary
that small messages should be signed. In 2005, Zhang et al. presented the first identity-based signature with
message recovery feature [6] for shortening signatures’ length, subsequently, Tso et al. [7] presented a revision
to Zhang et al.’s scheme, and proposed a construction more efficient than Zhang et al.’s scheme in 2007.
Proxy signatures. Proxy signatures for the first time were introduced by Mambo et al. [8] in 1996.
In a proxy signature scheme, an original signer, Alice, can delegate her signing right for signing messages
to another signer, Bob, called the proxy signer. Since the notion of proxy signatures has been introduced,
several variants of proxy signatures have been proposed. These include proxy signature schemes [9–17],
identity-based proxy signature schemes based on the bilinear pairings [18–25], designated verifier signature
?
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schemes [26–28], (identity-based) multi-proxy signatures [23, 29–33], identity-based proxy multi-signatures
[30, 34–37], (identity-based) multi-proxy multi-signature schemes [30, 38–43], identity-based proxy signatures
with message recovery [44, 45], a certificate-less proxy signature with message recovery and its security analysis
[46, 47] and analysis of proxy signatures [48–50]. In this study, we focus on identity-based proxy signature
schemes with message recovery property to shorten identity-based proxy signatures.
In identity-based proxy signature schemes with message recovery, a signed message is not requited to
be transmitted with the signature since the signed message has been inserted to the signature and can be
retrieved from the signature by anyone. The main feature of these schemes is to shorten identity-based proxy
signatures. This primitive is useful where bandwidth is one of the crucial concern [51, 52]. If original messages
are transmitted with these signatures, it defeats the main purpose of an identity-based proxy signature with
message recovery to save bandwidth. In order to save the bandwidth and provide more flexible management
of public keys, two identity-based proxy signatures with message recovery [44, 45] have been proposed. The
first one was proposed by Singh and Verma [44] in 2012. In 2013, Tian et al. [48] show that Singh and
Verma’s scheme is insecure by presenting two forgery attacks. Next, Yoon et al. proposed a secure identitybased proxy signature scheme with message recovery [45] to solve the problem of Singh and Verma’s scheme.
Unfortunately, Yoon et al.’s scheme [45] does not support provable security, and also we show that it is not
actually a scheme with message recovery property. Then, we present a short identity-based proxy signature
scheme with employing message recovery property, which is based on the identity-based signature scheme [4]
and the technique employed in [7] to achieve message recovery property, and show that it is secure under
CDH assumption in the random oracle model.
1.1

Organization of the paper

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents bilinear pairings and the CDH complexity
assumption employed as the signature foundation, the outline of identity-based proxy signature schemes with
message recovery and its security security model. Review and security drawback of Yoon et al.’s identitybased proxy signature with message recovery [45] are given in Section 3. Our proposed scheme and its formal
security proof are presented in Section 4. Section 5 and 6 present the comparison and conclusion, respectively.

2

Background

In this section, we review several fundamental backgrounds employed in this research, including bilinear
pairings and Computational Diffie-Hellman complexity assumption.
2.1

Bilinear pairings

Let (G, +) and (GT , .) be two cyclic groups of the same prime order q; furthermore, let P be a generator of
G. The map e : G × G → GT is said to be an admissible bilinear pairing if the following conditions hold true.
1. e is bilinear which means that e(cP, dP ) = e(P, P )cd for all c and d ∈ Z∗q
2. e is non-degenerate which means that e(P, P ) 6= 1GT
3. e is efficiently computable.
2.2

Complexity assumptions

Definition 1. Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem. Given (P, cP, dP ∈ G) for some unknown c
and d ∈ Z∗q , output cdP ∈ G.
Definition 2. The advantage of B, which is a polynomial bounded algorithm with a security parameter l,
in solving the CDH problem in group G is


CDH
AdvB
(l) = Pr cdP ← B(P, cP, dP ) | c, d ∈ Z∗q .

(1)

The probability is taken over the choice of c, d and B’s coin tosses. An algorithm B (t, )-breaks CDH
CDH
problem on G if it runs in time at most t, and AdvB
(l) is at least . The CDH assumption states that the
CDH problem on G is (t, )-hard if there is no algorithm B (t, )-breaks the CDH problem.
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2.3

Notations

Throughout the paper, we will use the following notations.
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

y||x: a concatenation of two strings y and x such that from y||x, y and x are effectively recoverable.
⊕ : X-OR operation.
[y]10 : the decimal representation of y ∈ {0, 1}∗ .
[y]2 : the binary representation of y.
l2 |y|: the first left l2 bits of y.
|y|l1 : the first right l1 bits of y.
|y|: the number of bits of y.
$

– s ← S : the operation of assigning a uniformly random element of S to s.
2.4

Outline of identity-based proxy signature schemes with message recovery

An original signer with identity IDo and a proxy signer with identity IDp and a verifier are participants
of an identity-based proxy signature with message recovery. An identity-based proxy signature scheme with
message recovery consists of Setup, KeyExtract, DelGen, DeleVer, PSign and PVer/MR algorithms as follows
[44].
– Setup: Given the system security parameter l, it outputs system’s parameters P ara and the system’s
master key (msk, mpk), i.e. (P ara, (msk, mpk)) ← Setup(l).
– KeyExtract: Given the system’s parameter P ara, master public key mpk, master secret key msk, and
an identity IDu , it outputs the corresponding secret key xu , i.e. xu ← KeyExtract(P ara, mpk, msk, IDu ).
– DelGen: Given the system’s parameter P ara, the master public key mpk, a warrant w, proxy signer’s
identity IDp , the original signer’s secret key xo , it outputs the delegation σo after a number of interactions to delegate original signer’s signing right on the warrant w to the identity IDp , i.e. σo ←
DelGen(P ara, mpk, w, IDp , xo ).
– DelVer: Given the system’s parameter P ara, the master public key mpk, the original signer’s identity
IDo , the warrant w and proxy signer’s identity IDp and the delegation σo , it outputs 1 if σo is a
valid delegation of the warrant w for identity IDp under the identity IDo and outputs 0 otherwise, i.e.
{0, 1} ← DelVer (P ara, mpk, IDo , w, IDp , σo ).
– PSign: Given the system’s parameter P ara, the master public key mpk, original signer’s identity IDo ,
the proxy signer’s identity IDp , the warrant w, the delegation σo , secret key xp of the proxy signer
with identity IDp and the message m to be signed, it outputs the identity-based proxy signature θ, i.e.
θ ← PSign(P ara, mpk, IDo , IDp , w, σo , xp , m).
– PVer/MR: Given the system’s parameter P ara, the master public key mpk, the original signer’s identity
IDo , the proxy signer’s identity IDp , the warrant w and the proxy signature θ, it first recovers the message
m, and outputs 1 if θ is a valid identity-based proxy signature of the message m and outputs 0 otherwise,
i.e. (m, {0, 1}) ← PVer /MR(P ara, mpk, IDo , IDp , w, θ).

2.5

Security model of identity-based proxy signatures with message recovery

In a warrant-based identity-based proxy signature scheme with message recovery, the delegation is the original
signer’s standard signature on a proxy signer’s identity IDp and a warrant w which contains information
regarding the period of validity and the restriction on the class of messages for which the warrant is valid.
Therefore, the properties of strong identifiability, strong undeniability, verifiability, and prevention of misuse
are satisfied naturally. Therefore, the signature scheme should be secure against existential forgery under an
adaptive-chosen-message, an adaptive-chosen warrant and chosen identity attack. The adversary A can choose
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the identities on which it wants to forge a proxy signature and can request the secret keys corresponding to
them (corrupted users) except for the honest signer, and also A can make delegation and proxy signature
queries on arbitrary warrants and messages under arbitrary identities including honest identity. To achieve
existential unforgeability, three types of potential adversaries are considered. Adversaries of type I which only
have identities of an original and a proxy signer, adversaries of type II which have the secret key of the proxy
signer in addition to capabilities of adversaries of type I and adversaries of type III which have the secret key
of the original signer in addition to identities of the original signer and the proxy signer.
Since an identity-based proxy signature scheme secure against type II (or type III) adversaries is also
secure against type I adversaries we will henceforth only consider type II and type III adversaries. To have
a formal definition for strong unforgeability, the adversary A and the challenger C should interact through
the following game[44].
1. Setup: Algorithm C runs the Setup algorithm with a security parameter l to obtain system’s parameter
para and the master key (mpk, msk), then it sends (mpk, para) to A.
2. The adversary A issues a polynomially bounded number of questions to the following oracles adaptively.
– KeyExtract: The adversary A can ask for the secret key corresponding to IDu , then C returns the
private key xu with running the KeyExtract algorithm.
– DelGen: Adversary A can request the delegation algorithm under the designator’s identity IDu on
the pair (w, IDp ) of its choice. Then, C returns σu ← DelGen(P ara, mpk, w, IDp , xu ) to A.
– PSign: Adversary A can request the proxy signature of m under proxy signer’s identity IDp , where
m is in the warrant w. In addition, A provides a valid delegation σo which indicates that an original signer with identity IDo delegates its signing right to the proxy signer with identity IDp on
the warrant w. In response, C firstly runs the KeyExtract algorithm to obtain the secret key xp
corresponding to the identity of the proxy signer with identity IDp . Next, C runs PSign protocol to
generate θ ← PSign(P ara, mpk, IDo , IDp , w, σo , xp , m). Then, C returns θ to the adversary A.
3. Eventually, A returns a valid signature (w∗ , θ∗ ) w.r.t. an original signer’s identity IDo∗ and a proxy signer’s
identity IDp∗ , and wins the game if the following conditions hold.
1. For adversaries of type II, we have
– E0 : Identity of the original signer IDo∗ has not been requested to the KeyExtract oracle.
– E1 : The pair (w∗ , IDp∗ ) has not been requested to the DelGen oracle under the original signer’s
identity IDo∗ .
2. For adversaries of type III, we have
– E0 : Identity of the proxy signer IDp∗ has not been requested to the KeyExtract oracle.
– E1 : The message m∗ has not been requested to the PSign oracle under the proxy signer’s identity
IDp∗ .
The formal definition of existential unforgeability for adversaries of type II (type III) is expressed in
Definition 3.
Definition 3. An identity-based proxy signature is (t, qH , qe , qd , qs , )-existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message (chosen warrant) attack and chosen identity attack if there is no adversary which runs
in time at most t, (makes at most qH queries to hash functions), makes at most qe KeyExtract queries, qd
DelGen queries and qs PSign queries, can win the aforementioned game with probability at least .

3

An Identity-based proxy signature scheme with message recovery

In this section, first we review Yoon et al.’s identity-based proxy signature scheme [45] with message recovery,
then, we show that it does not have message recovery property despite authors’ claim.
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3.1

Overview of Yoon et al.’s identity-based proxy signature scheme with message recovery

In 2013, Yoon et al. [45] proposed an identity-based proxy signature with message recovery to eliminate security problems [48] of Singh and Verma’s identity-based proxy signature with message recovery [44] presented
by Tian et al. in 2013. This scheme includes an original signer with identity IDo and a proxy signer with
identity IDp . Their scheme consists of the following algorithms:
1. Setup: The system parameters are as follows. Let l1 and l2 ∈ N, and let G be an additive cyclic group of
order q and GT be a multiplicative cyclic group of the same order q, where q is a prime and P ∈ G be a generator of G. Let H0 : {0, 1}∗ → G, H1 : GT → Z∗q , H : {0, 1}∗ → G, F1 : {0, 1}l2 → {0, 1}l1 , F2 : {0, 1}l1 →
{0, 1}l2 be random oracles, where l1 +l2 = |q|. It is assumed that x is a master secret key and Ppub = xP is a
master public key. Therefore, public parameters are P ara = {G, GT , H, H0 , H1 , F1 , F2 , e, P, Ppub , q, l1 , l2 }.
2. KeyExtract: On input a master secret key msk = x and a user’s identity IDu , the key distribution center
computes xu = xH(IDu ), and sends the user’s secret key xu over a secure and authenticated channel to
the user with identity IDu .
$

3. DelGen: The original signer with identity IDo chooses ko ← Z∗q , computes Ko = ko P , hw = H0 (IDo , w, Ko )
and s = ko hw +xo , and outputs the delegation (w, Ko , s) in order to delegate its signing right on a warrant
w to a proxy signer with the identity IDp .
4. PKGen: If a delegation (w, Ko , s) is valid, the proxy signing key dp = s + xp is generated by the proxy
signer with identity IDp .
5. PSign: The proxy signer with identity IDp can sign a message m in the warrant w as follows. The proxy
$

signer with identity IDp chooses kp ← Z∗q , computes Kp = kp P , β = F1 (m)||F2 (F1 (m)) ⊕ m, α = [β]10 ,
hm = H(IDp , α, Kp ) and U = kp hm + dp , and returns the proxy signature (w, Ko , Kp , U, α).
6. PVer: Given identities IDo and IDp and a signature (w, Ko , Kp , U, α), a verifier does as explained below:
– Checks if IDp is authorized by the identity IDo in the warrant w, otherwise, it stops.
– Accepts the proxy signature if and only if H1 (e(U, P )e(H(IDo ) + H(IDp ), ppub )−1 ) = H1 (e(hm , Kp )
e(hw , Ko )) holds, where hw = H0 (IDo , w, Ko ) and hm = H0 (IDp , α, Kp ), and recovers the message
by β = [α]2 and m = F2 (l1 |β|) ⊕ |β|l2 .
– Checks if the message m conforms to the warrant w, otherwise, it stops.

3.2

Why Yoon et al.’s scheme does not have message recovery property

Yoon et al.’s identity-based proxy signature scheme with message recovery [45] not only dose not support
provable security but also it does not have message recovery property despite its authors’ claim. Hence, it is
not short. The feature of message recovery in signatures is used to minimized the size of the signatures and the
message can be recovered from the signature by everyone. The signature in this scheme is (w, Ko , Kp , U, α),
where the message m is recovered as follows: a verifier computes β = [α]2 , and then m = F2 (l1 |β|) ⊕ |β|l2 .
To show that Yoon et al.’s scheme does not have message recovery, we use the fact that there is a direct
relation between α and m and everyone can extract the message m from α, and α is transmitted with the
signature. Consider a scheme as a modified version of Yoon et al.’s scheme in which we transform α to m
because of the aforementioned fact. In this case, the result signature is (w, Ko , Kp , U, m), and the signature U
can be generated on m instead of α. As a consequence, we obtain an ordinary identity-based proxy signature.
These two schemes are equivalent in their signature size since α is equivalent to m, and α or equivalently m is
transmitted with the signature. Therefore, Yoon et al.’s scheme does not support message recovery property
to reduce the signature size.
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4

Our identity-based proxy signature scheme with message recovery

In this section, we present an identity-based proxy signature scheme with message recovery based on the
identity-based signature scheme [4] and the technique employed in [7] to achieve message recovery property.
Then, we prove that it is secure under CDH assumption in the random oracle model.
4.1

Details of our identity-based proxy signature scheme with message recovery

In this section, we present the details of our identity-based proxy signature scheme with message recovery.
There are three participants in the system, an original signer with identity IDo , a proxy signer with identity
IDp and a verifier. Our scheme consists of seven algorithms as follows.
1. Setup: The system parameters are as follows. Let l1 and l2 ∈ N, and let G be an additive cyclic
group of order q and GT be a multiplicative cyclic group of the same order q, where q is a prime
and P ∈ G be a generator of G. Let H0 : {0, 1}∗ × GT → Z∗q , H1 : GT → {0, 1}|q| , H : {0, 1}∗ → G,
F1 : {0, 1}l2 → {0, 1}l1 , F2 : {0, 1}l1 → {0, 1}l2 be random oracles, where l1 + l2 = |q|. It is assumed that
x ∈R Z∗q is a master secret key and Ppub = xP is a master public key. Therefore, public parameters are
P ara = {G, GT , H, H0 , H1 , F1 , F2 , e, P, Ppub , q, l1 , l2 }.
2. KeyExtract: Given P ara, master secret key msk = x and the user identity IDu , the key distribution
center computes xu = xH(IDu ), and sends the user’s secret key xu over a secure and authenticated
channel to the user with identity IDu .
3. DelGen: Let w be a warrant for that an original signer with identity IDo who wants to delegate its
signing right a proxy signer with identity IDp , the delegation σo is generated as follows: the original
signer with identity IDo selects ko ∈ Z∗q , computes Ko = e(H(IDo ), Ppub )ko , h0 = H0 (w||IDp , Ko ) and
Uo = (h0 + ko )xo , and outputs the delegation (w, Ko , Uo ).
4. DelVer: Given original signer’s identity IDo and the delegation (w, Ko , Uo ), a verifier checks if e(Uo , P ) =
Ko e(H(IDo ), Ppub )h0 holds, where h0 = H0 (w||IDp , Ko ).
5. PSign: The proxy signer with identity IDp can sign a message m such that |m| = l2 under the warrant w with having a valid delegation σo = (w, Ko , Uo ). To do so, the proxy signer chooses kp ∈R Z∗q ,
computes Kp = Ko .e(H(IDp ), Ppub )kp , h1 = H1 (Kp ), β = F1 (m)||F2 (F1 (m)) ⊕ m, α = [β ⊕ h1 ]10 and
U = Uo + (α + kp )xp . The proxy signature θ on the message m is (w, U, α, Ko ).
6. PVer/MR: Given identities IDo and IDp and a signature θ = (w, U, α, Ko ), a verifier does as explained
below:
– Checks if IDp is authorized by the identity IDo in the warrant w, otherwise, it stops.
– Computes h1 = H1 (e(U, P )e(H(IDo ), Ppub )−h0 e(H(IDp ), Ppub )−α ), β ← [α]2 ⊕ h1 , and then recover
the message m = |β|l2 ⊕ F2 (l1 |β|), and accepts the signature θ on the message m if and only if
l1 |β| = F1 (m) holds, where h0 = H0 (w||IDp , Ko ), otherwise, it stops.
– Checks if the message m conforms to the warrant w, otherwise, it stops.
4.2

Analysis of the proposed scheme

In this subsection, we verify the correctness and prove existential unforgeability of the new identity-based
proxy signature scheme with message recovery in the random oracle model (see [53] for the background). In
order to prove unforgeability of the proposed scheme, we need to show that it is unforgeable against adversaries
of types II and III (as defined in Section 2.5). Since our security proofs are quite similar for two types of
adversaries, we have parametrized these proofs to prevent unnecessary repetitions of arguments. Hence, just
for notational settings, we refer to the adversary as A(1−k)II+kIII in which the parameter k ∈ {0, 1} makes
the difference between adversaries of types II and III (i.e. notationally we assume that we have an adversary
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of type II, AII , when k = 0 and an adversary of type III, AIII , when k = 1). Note that, the proofs for
different values of k are independent since different types of adversaries are independent.
To prove the security of our proposed scheme, and by contradiction, assuming an adversary A(1−k)II+kIII ,
we show that there is a solver (algorithm B) that can solve a random instance of the CDH problem with a nonnegligible probability. Our main result on the security of the proposed scheme is summarized in Theorem 1,
where the parameter k is used to code the result for both adversaries of types II and III. To start let us verify
the correctness of the proposed scheme, and we use e(Uo , P ) = Ko e(H(IDo ), Ppub )h0 in what follows.
e(U, P )e(H(IDo ), Ppub )−h0 e(H(IDp ), Ppub )−α
= e(Uo + (α + kp )xp , P )e(H(IDo ), Ppub )−h0 e(H(IDp ), Ppub )−α
= e(Uo , P )e(αxp , P )e(kp xp , P )e(H(IDo ), Ppub )−h0 e(H(IDp ), Ppub )−α
= e(Uo , P )e(H(IDp ), Ppub )α e(H(IDp ), Ppub )kp e(H(IDo ), Ppub )−h0 e(H(IDp ), Ppub )−α
= Ko e(H(IDo ), Ppub )h0 e(H(IDp ), Ppub )kp e(H(IDo ), Ppub )−h0
= Ko e(H(IDp ), Ppub )kp = Kp .

(2)

If θ is a valid signature, H1 (e(U, P )e(H(IDo ), Ppub )−h0 e(H(IDp ), Ppub )−α = Kp ) = h1 , and we have
F1 (m)||F2 (F1 (m)) ⊕ m = β = [α]2 ⊕ h1 . Hence, the message is recovered as m = |β|l2 ⊕ F2 (l1 |β|) and integrity
of the message is checked by F1 (m) = l1 |m|.
Also, in what follows we will be needing the following Splitting lemma.
Lemma 1. [54] Let S ⊂ X × Y such that Pr[(x, y) ∈ S] ≥ δ. For any γ < δ, define Ω = {(x, y) ∈
X × Y | Pry0 ∈Y [(x, y 0 ) ∈ S] ≥ δ − γ} and Ω̄ = (X × Y ) \ Ω, then the following statements hold:
– Pr[Ω] ≥ γ
– ∀(x, y) ∈ Ω, Pry0 ∈Y [(x, y 0 ) ∈ S] ≥ δ − γ}
– Pr[Ω|S] ≥ γδ .
Theorem 1. If the CDH problem is (t0 , 0 )-hard, then the proposed scheme is (t, qH , qH0 , qH1 , qe , qd , qs , )secure against the adversary A(1−k)II+kIII for a constant k ∈ {0, 1} such that
−|q|+1 2

−|q|

) (1−2
)
1 −2
0 ≥ (4(q
,
Hk +(1−k)qd +kqs )
0
t ≤ 2(t + qe (tm ) + qd (tm + tp + te ) + qs (1tp + 2te + 2tmT )),

(3)

where 1 ≥ qH −((1−k)qd (2qd +qH0 )2−|GT | −kqs (2qs +qH1 )2−|GT | ), and te , tm , tmT and tp are the time of an
exponentiation in GT , a scalar multiplication in G and GT and the time of a pairing computation, respectively.
In addition, qH , qH0 , qH1 , qe , qd and qs are the number of queries to oracles H, H0 , H1 , KeyExtract, DelGen
and PSign, respectively.
Proof. It is supposed that there is an adversary A(1−k)II+kIII against unforgeability of the scheme with
success probability . We construct another algorithm B to solve CDH problem with success probability 0 .
Given a random instance of the CDH problem (G, q, P, aP, bP ) output by the challenger C, B plans to find
abP .
The algorithm B runs Setup on a security parameter l, and gets (G, q, P, aP, bP ) to generate the public
parameter P ara = {G, GT , H, H0 , H1 , F1 , F2 , e, P, Ppub = aP, q, l1 , l2 } and sets i ← 1, and invokes the adversary A(1−k)II+kIII on it. The adversary A(1−k)II+kIII runs in time at most t, makes qH queries to the
random oracle H, qH0 queries to the random oracle H0 , qH1 queries to the random oracle H1 , qe queries to the
KeyExtract, qd queries to the DelGen and qs queries to the PSign algorithm, and can win the unforgeability
game with probability at least . Algorithm B answers A(1−k)II+kIII ’s oracle queries as described below.
– H0 (., .) queries: If T0 [., .] is defined for query (w||IDp , Ko ), then, B returns its value, otherwise B chooses
$

T0 [w||IDp , Ko ] ← Zq , and returns T0 [w||IDp , Ko ] to A(1−k)II+kIII .
$

– H1 (.) queries: If T1 [.] is defined for query Kp , then, B returns its value, otherwise B chooses T1 [Kp ] ←
{0, 1}|q| , and returns T1 [Kp ] to A(1−k)II+kIII .
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– H(.) queries: If T [IDi ] for query IDu is defined, then, B returns Xi as Xu . If this entry is not yet de$

fined, it sets IDi ← IDu , i ← i + 1, and sets T [IDi ] = (0, Xi = bP ) if i = t. If i 6= t, xi ← Zq , and sets
T [IDi ] = (xi , Xi = xi P ). Then, B returns Xi to A(1−k)II+kIII .
– KeyExtract queries for IDu : The algorithm B looks up T [IDi ], if i = t, it sets badKE ← true and aborts
the execution of A(1−k)II+kIII . Otherwise, B computes xu = xi Ppub , and returns xu to A(1−k)II+kIII . If
T [IDi ] for query IDu is not yet defined, it makes H(.) query for IDu .
– DelGen queries for (w, IDp ) under an identity IDo : If IDo 6= IDt , the algorithm B uses xo to generate
the delegation
and computes
sets badDG ←
(w, Ko , Uo , h0 )

$

$

following the real DelGen algorithm. If IDo = IDt , B chooses h0 ← Zq and Uo ← G,
Ko = e(Uo , P )e(H(IDo ), Ppub )−h0 . If T0 [w||IDp , Ko ] has already been defined, then B
true and halts; otherwise, it sets T0 [w||IDp , Ko ] ← h0 . Then, B returns the delegation
to the adversary A(1−k)II+kIII .

– PSign queries for a message m under proxy signer’s identity IDp : The algorithm B receives the delegation
(w, Ko , Uo , h0 ) from A(1−k)II+kIII . Next, B checks if the delegation is valid for proxy signer’s identity IDp
and the warrant w, if m conforms to the warrant w and if |m| = l2 . If all conditions hold and IDp 6= IDt , B
$

$

generates a valid signature following the real PSign algorithm. If IDp = IDt , B chooses α ← Z and U ←
G, and computes β = F1 (m)||F2 (F1 (m)) ⊕ m and Kp = e(U, P )e(H(IDo ), Ppub )−h0 e(H(IDp ), Ppub )−α .
If T1 [Kp ] has already been defined, then, B sets badP S ← true and halts; otherwise, it computes
h1 = β ⊕ [α]2 , and sets T1 [Kp ] ← h1 . Hence, the signature on the message m w.r.t. IDo and IDp is
θ = (w, U, α, Ko , h0 ).
– Finally, A(1−k)II+kIII outputs a forged identity-based proxy signature θ with original signer’s identity
IDo and proxy signer’s identity IDp . The forgery is non-trivial if IDo = IDt , and AII has not made
KeyExtract query on input IDo and DelGen query on input (w, IDp ) under identity IDo , or similarly, if
IDp = IDt , and AIII has not made KeyExtract query on input IDp and PSign query on input m under
identity IDp .
The probability of B in returning a forged signature (w, U, α, Ko , h0 ) is 1 = Pr[E1 ] Pr[E2 |E1 ] which is
computed as follows. First of all, we define events E1 and E2 .
– E1 : Algorithm B does not abort as a result of signature simulation (as a result of KeyExtract and
DelGen queries for AII and as a result of KeyExtract and PSign queries for AIII ).
– E2 : Adversary A(1−k)II+kIII returns a non-trivial forgery.
To lower-bound the probability of B, Pr[E1 ] , we need to compute the probability that B does not abort
in signature simulation; η = Pr[E1 ] = Pr[¬badKE ]((1 − k) Pr[¬badDG |¬badKE ] + k Pr[¬badP S |¬badKE ]),
where events badKE , badDG and badP S indicate that B aborts in signature simulation as a result of any of
A(1−k)II+kIII ’s KeyExtract, DelGen and PSign queries, respectively. These probabilities are computed as
follows.
Claim 1. Pr[¬badKE ] ≥

1
qH .

Proof. Pr[¬badKE ] is the probability that B does not abort as a result of A(1−k)II+kIII ’s KeyExtract
queries. The algorithm B does not abort at answering to KeyExtract queries when H(IDo ) = bP for
AII which means that IDo = IDt (when H(IDp ) = bP for AIII which means that IDp = IDt ), and the
probability of this event is at least q1H .
Claim 2. Pr[¬badDG |¬badKE ] ≥ 1 − qd ((qd + qH0 )2−|GT | ) − qd2 2−|GT | .
Proof. Events ¬badKE and ¬badDG are independent, so Pr[¬badDG |¬badKE ] = Pr[¬badDG ]. The value
of Pr[¬badDG ] is the probability that B does not abort as a result of DelGen queries. The algorithm
B aborts at answering to a DelGen query if badDG is set to true which means that there is a conflict

9

in the table T0 [., .]. The probability of finding a conflict in T0 [., .] for one DelGen query (w, IDp ) equals
the probability that (w||IDp , Ko ) generated in a DelGen simulation has been occurred by chance in a
previous query to the oracle H0 (., .). Since there are at most qH0 + qd entries in the table T0 [., .] and the
number of Ko , uniformly distributed in GT , is 2|GT | , the probability of this event for one DelGen query is
at most (qH0 + qd )2−|GT | . Hence, the probability of this event for qd queries is at most qd (qH0 + qd )2−|GT | .
In addition, this probability includes the probability that B previously used the same randomness Ko ,
uniformly distributed in GT , in one DelGen simulation. Since there are at most qd DelGen simulations,
this probability is at most qd 2−|GT | . Therefore, for qd DelGen queries the probability of this event is at
most qd2 2−|GT | .
Claim 3. Pr[¬badP S |¬badKE ] ≥ 1 − qs ((qs + qH1 )2−|GT | ) − qs2 2−|GT | .
Proof. Events ¬badKE and ¬badP S are independent, so Pr[¬badP S |¬badKE ] = Pr[¬badP S ]. The value of
Pr[¬badP S ] is the probability that B does not abort as a result of PSign queries. The algorithm B aborts
at answering to a PSign query if badP S is set to true which means that there is a conflict in the table
T1 [.]. The probability of finding a conflict in T1 [.] for one PSign query Kp equals the probability that Kp
generated in a PSign simulation has been occurred by chance in a previous query to the oracle H1 (.).
Since there are at most qH1 + qs entries in the table T1 [.] and the number of Kp , uniformly distributed
in GT , is 2|GT | , the probability of this event for one PSign query is at most (qH1 + qs )2−|GT | . Hence,
the probability of this event for qs queries is at most qs (qH1 + qs )2−|GT | . In addition, this probability
includes the probability that B previously used the same randomness Kp , uniformly distributed in GT , in
one PSign simulation. Since there are at most qs PSign simulations, this probability is at most qs 2−|GT | .
Therefore, for qs PSign queries the probability of this event is at most qs2 2−|GT | .
Claim 4. Pr[E2 |E1 ] ≥ .
Proof. The value of Pr[E2 |E1 ] is the probability that A(1−k)II+kIII returns a valid forgery provided
that B does not abort as a result of A(1−k)II+kIII ’s KeyExtract, DelGen and PSign queries. If B did
not abort as a result of A(1−k)II+kIII ’s queries, all its responses to those queries are valid. Therefore, by
hypothesis A(1−k)II+kIII will produce a non-trivial forgery with probability at least .
Therefore, the probability that B returns (w, U, α, Ko , h0 ) is at least 1 ≥ qH (1 − kqs ((qs + qH1 )2−|GT | ) −
kqs2 2−|GT | )(1 − (1 − k)qd ((qd + qH0 )2−|GT | ) − (1 − k)qd2 2−|GT | ) ≥ qH − ((1 − k)qd ((2qd + qH0 )2−|GT | ) −
kqs (2qs + qH1 )2−|GT | ). Since Hk is a random oracle for k ∈ {0, 1}, the probability of the event that
hk = Hk (kKP + (1 − k)(w||IDp , Ko )) for k ∈ {0, 1} is less than 2−|q|+1 , unless they are asked during
the attack. Hence, in what follows it is likely that queries kKP + (1 − k)(w||IDp , Ko ) for k ∈ {0, 1} are asked
during a successful attack. The lower bound of probability of producing a non-trivial forgery after making
queries to H0 and H1 oracles is 2 ≥ 1 − 2−|q|+1 . Then, B uses the oracle replay technique [54] to solve the
CDH problem.
Algorithm B employs two copies of A(1−k)II+kIII , guesses a fixed index 1 ≤ j ≤ (qHk + (1 − k)qd + kqs )
and hopes that j be the index of query kKP + (1 − k)(w||IDp , Ko ) to oracle Hk for which A(1−k)II+kIII
1
. Algorithm B
forges a proxy signature, and the probability of a good guess by chance is (qH +(1−k)q
d +kqs )
k
gives the same system parameters, the same identities and the same sequence of random bits to the two
copies of A(1−k)II+kIII , and responds with the same random answers to their queries for the oracles until
they ask the oracle Hk for jth query. At that point (the jth query to the oracle Hk ), B gives two random
answers hk and h0k such that hk 6= h0k to the hash queries Hk (forking). Hence, B obtains two proxy signatures
(w, U, α, Ko , h0 ) and (w, U 0 , α0 , Ko , h00 ) after A(1−k)II+kIII asks the same query kKP + (1 − k)(w||IDp , Ko )
from Hk . We employ Splitting Lemma to compute the probability of B in returning these two valid forgeries.
It is assumed that S denotes the set of successful executions of A(1−k)II+kIII when B simulates the
signature scheme, and the success probability of A(1−k)II+kIII in returning a non-trivial forgery is taken over
the space (X, Yk ), where X is the set of random bits and random oracle responses that A(1−k)II+kIII takes
up except for randomness related to the oracle Hk , and Yk is the set of random oracle responses to the oracle
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Hk . Hence, we have Pr[(X, Yk ) ∈ S] = 2 . With Splitting Lemma, we split the randomness Yk related to
Hk to (Yk0 , hk ), where Yk0 is the set of all random responses to different queries of Hk except for jth query
whose answer is denoted as hk . The Splitting Lemma ensures the existence of a subset of executions Ω such
2
. If B
that Pr[Ω|S] ≥ γδ = 12 , and for each (X, Yk ) ∈ S, Prh0k [(X, Yk0 , h0k ) ∈ S] ≥ δ − γ = 2(qH +(1−k)q
d +kqs )
k

replays the attack with fixed (X, Yk0 ) and a randomly chosen h0k ∈ {0, 1}|q| , it gets another successful pair
((X, Yk0 ), h0k ) such that hk 6= h0k with probability

2 (1−2−|q| )
4(qHk +(1−k)qd +kqs ) .

After two successful executions of A(1−k)II+kIII , B obtains ((X, Yk0 ), hk ) and ((X, Yk0 ), h0k ), hk 6= h0k
which means that it obtains two valid forgeries (w, U, α, Ko , h0 ) and (w, U 0 , α0 , Ko , h00 ) with probability 0 ≥
22 (1−2−|q| )
4(qHk +(1−k)qd +kqs ) ,

where 2 ≥ 1 − 2−|q|+1 .
0

U −U
From valid forgeries (w, U, α, Ko , h0 ) and (w, U 0 , α0 , Ko , h00 ), B computes abP as abP = (α−α
0 ) if k = 1.
0
In this case, we have the adversary AIII and since h1 6= h1 and α = [β ⊕ h1 ]10 , we have α 6= α0 , while
other random values especially (xp , xo , ko , kp ) are the same and h0 = h00 . If k = 0, B computes abP as
0
0
abP = (hU0−U
−h00 ) . In this case, we have the adversary AII and h0 6= h0 , while other random values especially
0
0
(xp , xo , ko , kp ) are the same and h1 = h1 or equivalently α = α .
Algorithm B’s run-time t0 is twice of A(1−k)II+kIII ’s run-time, t, plus the time required to respond to
hash queries, qe KeyExtract, qd DelGen and qs PSign queries.
We assume that an exponentiation in GT takes time te , a scalar multiplication in G and GT take time tm
and tmT , respectively, and a pairing computation takes time tp , while other operations take zero time. Each
random oracle or KeyExtract query takes time tm , each DelGen simulation takes time tm + tp + te , and
a proxy signature with message recovery simulation takes time 1tp + 2te + 2tmT , therefore B’s run-time is
t0 ≤ 2(t + qe (tm ) + qd (tm + tp + te ) + qs (1tp + 2te + 2tmT )). This completes the proof.


5

Comparison

The comparison for some short identity-based proxy signatures is summarized in Table 2. The comparison
is in terms of DeleGen-Cost, DeleVer-Cost, PSign-Cost and PVer-Cost which are dominating computational
cost in delegation generation, delegation verification, proxy signature generation and proxy signature verification, respectively. The computational cost for proxy secret key generation algorithm is ignored in the
comparison. For the sake of comparison, we consider expensive operations, and we consider pre-computations
in presenting the number of operations such that the same operations during generation and verification of
different signatures are computed one time and before each algorithm. For example, terms e(H(IDo ), Ppub )
and e(H(IDp ), Ppub ) in our scheme are the same for different signatures, so, they can be computed before
signature generation and verification. As a consequence, we ignore them when we present the number of
operations in Table 2. Table 1 presents definitions of symbols used in comparison.

Symbols Definitions
P
pairing evaluation
ET
exponentiation in group GT
mG
scalar multiplication in G
mGT
scalar multiplication in GT
l2
the number of bits of a message m
l3
the number of bits of a warrant w
Table 1. Symbols’ definitions in comparison

In Table 2, we do not consider two identity-based proxy signature schemes with message recovery [44, 45]
since non of them is secure.
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As shown in Table 2, if we consider just pairing computation, the most expensive operation [55], cost to
simplify the computational cost comparison, our scheme is more efficient than those presented in [25, 20, 24,
22], and approximately as efficient as those presented in [19, 21].

Scheme

DeleGen
Cost
Our Scheme
1ET + 1mG
Shim [25]
3mG + 1P
Wu et al. [20]
2mG
Ji et al. [22]
2mG
Xu, Zhang and Feng [24] 2mG
Zhang and Zou [19]
2mG + 1ET
Gu and Zhu [21]
1mG + 2ET
+1mGT

DeleVer
Cost
1P + 1ET + 1mGT
3P + 1mG
2P
2P + 1mG
2P
1P + 1ET
1P + 2ET
+2mGT

PSign
Cost
1ET + 1mGT + 1mG
3mG
2mG
2mG
2mG
2mG + 1ET
1mGT + 2ET

PVer
Cost
1P + 2mGT + 2ET
3P + 2mG
3P
1mG + 2P
3P + 1ET
1P + 2ET
2mGT + 2ET
+1P

Signature
Size
2|G| + |q| + l3
3|G| + l2 + l3
3|G| + l2 + l3
3|G| + l2 + l3
3|G| + l2 + l3
1|G| + 2|GT | + l2 + l3
2|GT | + |G|
+l2 + l3

Table 2. Comparison between our scheme and some existing schemes

As shown in Table 2, our scheme is shorter than all other existing identity based proxy signature schemes
since l2 , the number of bits of a signed message, is omitted in its size. To make it clearer, we write signature
size of schemes in terms of bits in Table 3. In the following, let’s assume that q be a 170-bit prime, and
using any of the families of curves described in [56] to have security the same as the security of the standard
1024-bit RSA signature, each element of the group G and GT will be 171 and 1024 bits, respectively.

Scheme
Actual Signature Size
Our Scheme
512 + l3
Shim [25]
513 + l2 + l3
Wu et al. [20]
513 + l2 + l3
Ji et al. [22]
513 + l2 + l3
Xu, Zhang and Feng [24] 513 + l2 + l3
Zhang and Zou [19]
2219 + l2 + l3
Gu and Zhu [21]
2219 + l2 + l3
Table 3. Signature-size comparison (in bits)

As shown in Tables 3 and 2, our scheme is the shortest compared to all other existing identity based proxy
signature schemes since the message m is not required to be transmitted with the signature.

6

Conclusion

In this paper, we showed that Yoon et al.’s identity-based proxy signature scheme with message recovery
does not have message recovery property despite their authors’ claim, therefore, it is not short. Hence,
there was no provably secure short identity-based proxy signature. Then, we proposed a short identity-based
proxy signature scheme with message recovery feature which is secure under CDH problem in the random
oracle model. As shown in comparison, the size of our signature is reduced compared to identity-based proxy
signatures since the original message is not transmitted with the signature. This primitive is useful where
bandwidth is one of the crucial concern. Our scheme is designed for messages with fixed length and it can
be modified to provide partial message recovery property with the technique presented by Tso et al. in
[7]. Furthermore, our scheme is more efficient than (as efficient as) previous identity-based proxy signature
schemes.
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